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INTRODUCTION 
To examine always-listening device issues and their impact on Nevada, this 
Note will proceed in five parts. Part I will discuss the general technological and 
legal background of always-listening devices—how they came to be and how 
 
*  Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2021, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas. Thank you to my soon wife, Kira, for inspiring this Note and supporting me al-
ways; to my mother, Jill, for my love of writing; and to Volume 21 of the Nevada Law Journal 
for all the hard work dedicated to this Note. 
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courts have handled them so far. Part II will address possible evidentiary issues 
with always-listening device transcripts and audio recordings—how they are cur-
rently treated as evidence and how courts should treat them as evidence. Part III 
will parse through the Constitutional issues consistently connected with using 
recordings and transcripts from always-listening devices as evidence. Part IV 
will then cover how new laws concerning always-listening devices could impact 
criminal trials and deter domestic violence. Finally, Part V will present recom-
mendations for specific legislation for Nevada to adopt. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR MODERN ISSUES 
A. Development of Always-Listening Devices 
The past half-decade introduced a new presence into many American house-
holds. In 2019, sixty-six million American adults owned a smart speaker (“al-
ways-listening device”), which was up nearly 40 percent from ownership in 
2018.1 According to Forbes.com, 42 percent of always-listening device owners 
believe their devices are essential to their everyday lives.2 These numbers indi-
cate a growing trend in the American household that is not likely to falter anytime 
soon. As tech giants like Amazon, Google, and Apple develop always-listening 
devices, the devices become cheaper to produce and more equipped to solve us-
ers’ problems. As the devices become cheaper and more convenient, users are 
more incentivized to purchase them. With this pairing of development and de-
mand, it may not be long until always-listening devices find themselves in more 
American households than not.3 
While always-listening devices themselves are rapidly growing in popular-
ity, the convenient services provided for the devices’ users stem from the soft-
ware behind the speakers. Smart assistants, like Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri, 
and Google’s Google Assistant, interact with users through the always-listening 
devices and can access online data for the users with the ease and speed of a 
person-to-person conversation.4 Whether a user needs to set an alarm, look up 
 
1  Bret Kinsella, U.S. Smart Speaker Ownership Rises 40% in 2018 to 66.4 Million and Ama-
zon Echo Maintains Market Share Lead Says New Report from Voicebot, VOICEBOT.AI (Mar. 
7, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://voicebot.ai/2019/03/07/u-s-smart-speaker-ownership-rises-40-in-
2018-to-66-4-million-and-amazon-echo-maintains-market-share-lead-says-new-report-from-
voicebot [https://perma.cc/L438-HV9H]. 
2  Rebecca Lerner, Smart Speakers Are the Future of Audio, FORBES (June 23, 2017, 12:49 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccalerner/2017/06/23/smart-speakers-are-the-future-
of-audio/ [https://perma.cc/Y4NR-3N7C]. 
3  See LOUP VENTURES, SMART SPEAKER HOUSEHOLD PENETRATION RATE IN THE UNITED 
STATES FROM 2014 TO 2025, STATISTA (2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1022847/uni 
ted-states-smart-speaker-household-penetration [https://perma.cc/8ZG4-PTNN] (projecting 
always-listening devices will penetrate 50 percent of American households by 2021 and 75 
percent by 2025). 
4  See, e.g., All Things Alexa: Alexa Features, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/b/ref=aeg_l 
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the weather, or listen to their horoscope, smart assistants are able to dig through 
the internet and return the requested information in a matter of seconds.5 
Smart assistants are not just search engines for always-listening devices. 
True, Apple was the first company to bring smart assistants to mainstream con-
sumers when Siri was released on the iPhone 4s in 2011.6 However, Apple did 
not create Siri. Siri was originally an artificial intelligence program created for 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency by SRI International.7 In 2010, 
SRI published the original Siri personal assistant app and within two months 
Steve Jobs began the process of purchasing Siri.8 
Siri was originally only accessible to users utilizing the Siri function on their 
iPhones.9 However, Apple introduced a new function in 2014 allowing users to 
access Siri by saying “Hey Siri.”10 That same year, Amazon entered the smart 
assistant market with their own program called Amazon Alexa.11 Alexa differed 
from Siri in that Alexa was not restricted to a smart phone. Instead, Alexa was 
primarily accessible through Amazon’s Echo, a small smart speaker to be placed 
in rooms within users’ homes and connected to their home wifi.12 Amazon’s co-
introduction of Alexa and Echo marked the age of smart assistants merging with 
always-listening devices. 
Amazon’s Alexa also marked a distinct shift in the direction of smart assis-
tants because it separated the smart assistant from the smart phone. Where Siri 
was a feature that essentially extended the search functions already offered on 
 
p_features/ref=s9_acss_bw_cg_aeglp_md1_w?node=17934672011&pf_rd_m [https://perma. 
cc/CU69-CY5F]; Siri Does More Than Ever. Even Before You Ask., APPLE, https://www.ap-
ple.com/siri [https://perma.cc/DJ3B-DNR4]; How Can We Help You? What You Can Ask Your 
Google Assistant, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/assistant/?hl=en#topic=7658431 [http 
s://perma.cc/PJ54-BW4]. 
5  See Ali Montag, Here’s What People Actually Use Their Amazon Echo and Other Smart 
Speakers for, CNBC (Sept. 10, 2018, 1:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/10/adobe-an-
alytics-what-people-use-amazon-echo-and-smart-speakers-for.html [https://perma.cc/7NDG-
8NSL]. 
6  Press Release, Apple, Apple Launches iPhone 4s, iOS 5 & iCloud (Oct. 4, 2011), https://ww 
w.apple.com/newsroom/2011/10/04Apple-Launches-iPhone-4S-iOS-5-iCloud [https://perma. 
cc/4HZG-9K69]. 
7  Bianca Bosker, Siri Rising: The Inside Story of Siri’s Origins – and Why She Could Over-
shadow the iPhone, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/siri-do-engine-
apple-iphone_n_2499165 [https://perma.cc/X257-G83D]. 
8  Id. 
9  Parmy Olson, Steve Jobs Leaves a Legacy in A.I. with Siri, FORBES (Oct. 6, 2011, 12:24 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/10/06/steve-jobs-leaves-a-legacy-in-a-i 
-with-siri [https://perma.cc/G6QD-KXZ2]. 
10  Jason Cipriani, What You Need to Know About ‘Hey, Siri’ in iOS 8, CNET (Sept. 18, 2014, 
12:00 PM), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/what-you-need-to-know-about-hey-siri-in-ios-8 [ht 
tps://perma.cc/ET25-MGW9]. 
11  Darrell Etherington, Amazon Echo Is a $199 Connected Speaker Packing an Always-On 
Siri-Style Assistant, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:14 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/11/ 
06/amazon-echo [https://perma.cc/8QLK-YVPD]. 
12  Id. 
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internet-connected mobile smartphones, Alexa operated through  home-bound 
always-listening devices.13 Additionally, while Siri was fully functional without 
activating the “Hey Siri” function that turned a user’s phone into an always-lis-
tening device, Alexa had no such setting.14 Alexa appears to have started as, and 
largely remained, a smart assistant intended to operate through always-listening 
devices.15 
While this might have merely been a philosophical difference between Ap-
ple and Amazon at first, the development of the technology has revealed that 
always-listening devices are the future of smart assistants. In 2016, Google 
joined the always-listening device market by releasing Google Assistant, 
Google’s own smart assistant accessible through its own always-listening device, 
Google Home.16 Google Home is a device that, both in appearance and use, mir-
rored Amazon’s Echo.17 
Google has since extended the Google Assistant program to their smart 
phones and certain Android devices, but it primarily exists as a part of Google 
Home and Google’s new “smart display” devices.18 In response, Amazon also 
extended the Alexa program by creating the Amazon Alexa App for 
smartphones.19 Yet, Apple has also followed Amazon’s path with the release of 
the HomePod,20 an always-listening device which integrates Siri into users’ 
smart homes. 
While smart assistants may have begun as a smart phone app, always-listen-
ing devices may serve as the primary utilization of the technology.21 With that 
transition looming, users who decide to purchase and activate an always-listen-
ing device must consider what this new presence will change about their privacy 
within their homes. 
 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Jared Newman, For Amazon, the Future of Alexa Is About the End of the Smartphone Era, 
FAST CO. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40479207/for-amazon-the-future-of-
alexa-is-about-the-end-of-the-smartphone-era [https://perma.cc/HXB3-KV3J].  
16  Steve Kovach, Google Unveils Its Newest Major Product: The Google Home Speaker, BUS. 
INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2016, 9:58 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/google-home-announced-
price-release-date-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/3E32-QFGD]. 
17  Aaron Tilley, Google Home vs. Amazon Echo: Everything You Need to Know, FORBES (Oct. 
4, 2016, 5:49 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aarontilley/2016/10/04/google-home-vs-am-
azon-echo [https://perma.cc/MUZ7-FQMC]. 
18  Dieter Bohn, Google Is Introducing a New Smart Display Platform, THE VERGE (Jan. 8, 
2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/8/16860142 [https://perma.cc/A9J3-HZP 
S]. 
19  Amazon Alexa App Details and Download, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-
com-Amazon-Alexa/dp/B00P03D4D2 [https://perma.cc/JY4K-TYFS]. 
20  HomePod, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/homepod [https://web.archive.org/web/2020101 
1065142/https://www.apple.com/homepod/]. 
21  Kovach, supra note 16. 
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B. Always-Listening Devices in the Law 
The original legal issues Siri faced as the first-to-market smart assistant in-
cluded, inter alia, the following: copyright, ownership of intellectual property, 
liability issues for reliance on Siri’s mistakes.22 However, now that smart assis-
tants are intertwined with always-listening devices, a new set of issues must be 
addressed. 
The biggest difference for Siri in the past decade is that a user in 2012 had 
to press a button to prompt Siri to begin listening, and a user in 2019 simply 
needs to say, “Hey Siri.”23 This change is incredibly important in the scope of 
legal issues because it begs the following question: how does Siri know to listen 
only when someone says “Hey Siri” if Siri is not already listening? More directly, 
are Siri/Alexa/Google devices recording all of our conversations? Apple, Ama-
zon, and Google have all addressed this question with a concrete “no.”24 How-
ever, the companies do admit that when an always-listening device is activated, 
the transcript of questions and answers is stored on the respective company’s 
cloud.25 
Those transcripts, while private, are not exclusively accessible to the user 
who participated in their creation.26 Amazon allows users to go into their account 
settings and manually delete audio recordings held in the Amazon cloud but oth-
erwise retains recordings and transcribes indefinitely.27 Even if the recordings 
are deleted, however, Amazon retains underlying data such as what actions were 
taken by Alexa in response to the question, purchase records processed through 
Alexa, and others.28 Google fully discloses that it will share transcripts to “[m]eet 
any applicable law, regulation, legal process, or enforceable governmental re-
quest.”29 
Apple, Amazon, and Google have also come under fire because their devices 
listened in when they were not supposed to. For example, in 2017, a San Diego 
 
22  John Weaver, Siri Is My Client: A First Look at Artificial Intelligence and Legal Issues, 
N.H. BAR J., Winter 2012, at 6, 7–9. 
23  Cipriani, supra note 10. 
24  Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/displ 
ay.html?nodeId=201602230 [https://perma.cc/CD65-22F6]; Lisa Vaas, Siri Is Listening to 
You, but She’s NOT Spying, Says Apple, NAKED SEC. (Aug. 13, 2018), https://nakedsecurity.so 
phos.com/2018/08/13/siri-is-listening-to-you-but-shes-not-spying-says-apple [https://perma.c 
c/LH7L-BCX4]; Data Security and Privacy on Devices That Work with Assistant, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/googlenest/answer/7072285 [https://perma.cc/MH2R-N3RH]. 
25  Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/cus-
tomer/display.html?nodeId=GVP69FUJ48X9DK8V [https://perma.cc/7Z3Y-UU36]. 
26  Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 24. 
27  Charlie Osborne, Amazon Confirms Alexa Customer Voice Recordings Are Kept Forever, 
ZDNET (July 3, 2019, 2:49 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/amazon-confirms-alexa-cus-
tomer-voice-recordings-are-kept-forever [https://perma.cc/R7VJ-7VFM]. 
28  Id. 
29  Privacy Policy: When You Share Your Information, GOOGLE, https://policies.google.com/pr 
ivacy?hl=en#infosharing [https://perma.cc/2JLJ-8VXT]. 
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news anchor reporting on a child who ordered a doll house through her family’s 
Amazon Echo stated, “I love the little girl saying, ‘Alexa ordered me a doll-
house.’ ”30 While the original story may have merely been a humorous misunder-
standing, Amazon faced criticism when several Echo devices in San Diego 
homes heard the broadcast and proceeded to order dollhouses for their owners.31 
While the devices were technically activated by the trigger word “Alexa,” the 
users did not specifically speak to the device and ask it to do anything. This mis-
understanding begs a more serious question; what happens if transcripts are 
brought in as evidence against an always-listening device’s owner in criminal 
court when there is a chance the defendant was not the one being recorded and 
transcribed? 
This was an important issue for Arkansas in State v. Bates.32 In late 2016, 
reports indicated that police in Arkansas were attempting to gain access to audio 
recordings from a murder suspect’s Amazon Echo device.33 The man, James 
Bates, hosted a viewing party for some football games, and the next morning one 
of his guests was found dead in Bates’ backyard hot tub.34 During their investi-
gation, police noticed the Amazon Echo device located in Bates’ kitchen and 
seized it.35 They were able to gain some information from the device, but they 
were unable to tell if the device had recorded any audio around the time of the 
murder.36 The police then obtained a search warrant for the device’s cloud-based 
information and demanded that Amazon submit any recording information from 
the device, but Amazon did not fully comply.37 
Instead of turning over all of the data, Amazon submitted only Bates’ ac-
count information and purchase history.38 Amazon then released a statement af-
firming: “Amazon will not release customer information without a valid and 
binding legal demand properly served on us. Amazon objects to overbroad or 
otherwise inappropriate demands as a matter of course.”39 
 
30  Andrew Liptak, Amazon’s Alexa Started Ordering People Dollhouses After Hearing Its 
Name on TV, THE VERGE (Jan. 7, 2017, 5:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/7/14200 
210 [https://perma.cc/38BG-Y8U3]. 
31  Id. 
32  Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 6–7, 
Arkansas v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Feb. 17, 2017). 
33  Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo Factors in Murder Inves-
tigation, NPR: ALL TECH CONSIDERED (Dec. 28, 2016, 3:20 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections 
/alltechconsidered/2016/12/28/507230487 [https://perma.cc/L242-ZZ62]. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
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While Amazon’s stance on the issue was never tested in that Arkansas court-
room,40 Bates showed that Amazon was willing to stand by users of their always-
listening device to prevent potentially errant recordings from being used against 
them. 
This issue is not one that will just go away. With always-listening devices 
gaining steady popularity year after year, it is inevitable that something like the 
situation in Arkansas will come up again. For that reason, rather than waiting for 
the equally inevitable litigation to create common law based on specific circum-
stances, Nevada must legislate these issues. 
C. Nevada’s Historical Approach to Recordings 
Nevada considers the unauthorized recording of a conversation a felony.41 
That means that no party may have their communications recorded and used 
against them in court without their consent. It may appear that this solves the 
issue of state prosecutors using always-listening device transcripts against their 
users; however, Nevadans are not saved by the lack of explicit consent to being 
recorded. 
Nevada requires all parties to a communication consent to being recorded 
for the recording to be lawful.42 This precludes the admission of telephone re-
cordings taken without a defendant’s consent against them in a criminal trial.43 
Unfortunately, that statutory protection is unlikely to prevent the admission of 
recordings from always-listening devices. Once activated, always-listening de-
vices necessarily record users and transmit information over the internet.44 This 
should be no secret to users who automatically consent to their recordings being 
used to improve their experience upon activating their always-listening device.45 
If consent to being recorded is a necessary part of the always-listening device 
experience, it is unlikely that a court would consider the recordings to be inter-
cepted without consent of the user. 
 
40  “[A] circuit court judge granted [Arkansas prosecutors’] request to have the charges . . . dis-
missed. The prosecutors declared nolle prosequi, [a formal notice that there will be no further 
prosecution], stating that the evidence could support more than one reasonable explanation.” 
Colin Dwyer, Arkansas Prosecutors Drop Murder Case That Hinged on Evidence from Ama-
zon Echo, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (Nov. 29, 2017, 5:42 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thet 
wo-way/2017/11/29/567305812 [https://perma.cc/37R4-QRRR] (emphasis added). 
41  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.620, 690 (2019); Ditech Fin. LLC v. Buckles, 401 P.3d 215, 217 
(Nev. 2017) (quoting Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 938, 940 (Nev. 1998)). 
42  Ditech, 401 P.3d at 217. 
43  McLellan v. Nevada, 182 P.3d 106, 109 (Nev. 2008). 
44  Richard Baguley & Colin McDonald, Appliance Science: Alexa, How Does Alexa Work? 
The Science of the Amazon Echo, CNET (Aug. 4, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/new 
s/appliance-science-alexa-how-does-alexa-work-the-science-of-amazons-echo/ [https://perm 
a.cc/H73T-LEGA]. 
45  Alexa Terms of Use, AMAZON cl. 3.1, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.h 
tml?nodeId=201809740 [https://perma.cc/3L3J-TEX3]. I leave the discussion of whether this 
should qualify as consent to another note. 
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With statutory protections absent, Nevadans must consider whether their use 
of always-listening devices could expose them to liability. Nevada’s rules of ev-
idence follow closely to the Federal Rules of Evidence. One section that is nearly 
identical is Nevada’s section regarding treatment of records of regularly con-
ducted activity. 
A record made during the regular course of activity is an evidentiary excep-
tion presented in the federal system and in Nevada.46 Under Nevada Revised 
Statute section 51.135, any record or compilation of data from information trans-
mitted by a person with knowledge—during the course of a regularly conducted 
activity—may be admitted as evidence in both civil and criminal trials.47 Under 
a general reading of the law, recordings made by always-listening devices seem 
to fall under this exception. An always-listening device records (creates a record 
of) sounds and words (information transmitted) of users who utter the device’s 
trigger word (by persons with knowledge) every time it is triggered (during reg-
ularly conducted activity).48 
Records of a regularly conducted activity may very well apply to recordings 
of purposefully directed questions. However, this should not be concerning for 
the vast majority of individuals who mainly use their device for weather updates 
and background music. What users should fear for is whether the exception al-
lows the admissibility of recordings transcribed mistakenly. 
This fear of mistakenly transcribed recordings is best explained through a 
hypothetical similar to the San Diego incident mentioned above. One hypothet-
ical user, Alex, owns an Amazon Echo device that is set to always listen for its 
trigger word, “Alexa.” One night, Alex has several  friends over to play the video 
game Assassin’s Creed.49 At some point during the night, a friend needing advice 
for Assassin’s Creed asks “Alex, how do you hide a body?”50 Alex’s Alexa is 
mistakenly triggered by the word “Alex,” transcribes the request, and searches 
the internet for “how to hide a body.” Several months later, Alex is falsely ac-
cused of murder and that same Alexa transcript is recovered by the prosecution. 
Through the regularly conducted activity exception to hearsay, the prosecution 
may successfully admit both “Alex’s” question and Alexa’s answer into evi-
dence.51 
Some may see this hypothetical as an example of a transcript being created 
outside of regularly conducted business and determine that a system to properly 
categorize purposeful statements from accidental statements must be established 
for this technology to be acceptable in court at all. After all, the recording and 
 
46  NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019); FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
47  NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019). 
48  See id.; Baguley & McDonald, supra note 44. 
49  See Jack Fennimore, Assassin’s Creed Origins: 10 Tips & Tricks for Stealth, HEAVY (Oct. 
27, 2017, 4:29 AM), https://heavy.com/games/2017/10/assassins-creed-origins-tips-tricks-ste 
alth [https://perma.cc/E698-NKWU]. 
50  See id. (including the skill of hiding dead bodies among tips to play Assassin’s Creed). 
51  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019). 
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transcribing of a user’s words outside of directly prompted requests is not the 
regular activity of these companies.52 However, solving just this issue is not 
likely to prohibit the use of these transcripts in court. While the hypothetical lists 
“regularly conducted activity” as the method of admission, transcripts are not 
restricted to a single avenue of admissibility. For instance, the hypothetical pros-
ecution could have also prevailed by asserting the party opponent exception to 
hearsay.53 
The issue at hand, especially here in Nevada and in states with similar laws, 
is that no single exception to hearsay prevents potentially fraudulent transcripts 
into evidence. So, these states must address what can be done once the transcripts 
are inevitably considered admissible under multiple exceptions to the hearsay 
rule of evidence. To that point, courts outside of Nevada have not been able to 
reach a clear conclusion. For instance, in the Bates case discussed above,54 Ar-
kansas faced the challenge of determining what information the government 
should be able to glean from always-listening devices without the guidance of 
legislation.55 
In Bates, the Arkansas court issued a search warrant requiring Amazon to 
turn over voice recordings associated with the transcript that had been previously 
subpoenaed.56 While the original transcript included plenty of information, the 
prosecution needed the audio recordings to confirm Bates was the one who is-
sued the questions.57 Amazon issued a lengthy motion in support of their users’ 
First Amendment rights to browse the internet anonymously.58 However, before 
the court could issue a ruling on the matter, the defendant consented to the release 
of his audio recordings.59 
This Note argues that Nevada should not wait to face the same situation Ar-
kansas faced in 2017. Instead of waiting for issues to arise in court to determine 
the accessibility of these recordings to law enforcement and litigating parties, 
Nevada’s legislature should amend statutes currently in place to include record-
ings from always-listening devices as information that may be requested by 
 
52  See supra note 24. 
53  A party’s own statement is not hearsay when it is offered into evidence against the party. 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035(3)(a); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(a). 
54  See supra Section I.B. 
55  Brian Heater, After Pushing Back, Amazon Hands over Echo Data in Arkansas Murder 
Case, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 7, 2017, 6:26 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/03/07/amazon-ec 
ho-murder [https://perma.cc/9CUP-HABF]. 
56  Brian Heater, Amazon Cites First Amendment Protection for Alexa in Arkansas Murder 
Case, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 23, 2017, 8:45 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/23/alexa-free-
speech [https://perma.cc/MSE7-PTGN]. 
57  See Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant, supra 
note 32, at 37. 
58  Thomas Brewster, Amazon Argues Alexa Speech Protected by First Amendment in Murder 
Trial Fight, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2017, 7:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/ 
2017/02/23/amazon-echo-alexa-murder-trial-first-amendment-rights [https://perma.cc/BT8X 
-K94U]. 
59  Heater, supra note 55. 
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warrant and admitted as evidence by default. To understand why the legislature 
would do this, the rules of evidence affecting always-listening device recordings 
must also be understood. 
II. PROSECUTION MOVES ALWAYS-LISTENING DEVICES INTO EVIDENCE 
A. Transcripts and Recordings Under Nevada’s Hearsay Laws 
Hearsay is an out of court statement offered into evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted.60 This rule is in place almost identically across all juris-
dictions in the United States.61 Hearsay is dangerous in the courtroom because it 
carries several difficulties including trustworthiness, authentication, and reliabil-
ity.62 However, when an out of court statement is surrounded by elements quell-
ing those difficulties, the legal system is much more inclined to accept them. 
Hence, there are several established exceptions to hearsay codified into the Ne-
vada Revised Statutes and the Federal Rules of Evidence.63 
The hearsay exception most applicable to audio recordings processed 
through always-listening devices is likely the record of regularly conducted ac-
tivity exception.64 This exception is often referred to as the business record ex-
ception and is used to admit business documents.65 It would stand to reason that 
always-listening devices, which are certainly products within the overall busi-
ness of their companies, would fall under this exception completely. However, 
the exception might not necessarily cover the audio recordings from an always-
listening device.  
On the one hand, according to Amazon, always-listening device recordings 
are not sold or actively traded.66 Nor are the audio recordings specifically used 
in the smart assistant’s search function.67 Instead, the recordings are transcribed, 
and that transcript is fed into the search algorithm for business use.68 
 
60  NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.035 (2019); FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
61  Stephen A. Saltzburg, Rethinking the Rationale(s) for Hearsay Exceptions, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1485, 1485 (2016); see, e.g., COLO. R. EVID. 801(c); N.M. R. EVID. 11-801(C); IDAHO R. 
EVID. 801(c). 
62  See Carl C. Wheaton, What Is Hearsay?, 46 IOWA L. REV. 210, 219–20 (1961). 
63  NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 51.075–51.385 (2019). The Federal Rules of Evidence even provide a 
catch all rule which makes admissible any statement supported by “sufficient guarantees of 
trustworthiness” which is “more probative on the point for which it is offered” than any other 
reasonably obtainable evidence. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
64  NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.135 (2019). 
65  “The basis for the business record exception is that accuracy is assured because the maker 
of the record relies on the record in the ordinary course of business activities.” A.L.M.N., Inc. 
v. Rosoff, 757 P.2d 1319, 1326 (Nev. 1988) (quoting Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 
1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
66  Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, supra note 25. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
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On the other hand, the recordings are created in the process of transcribing, 
which is a regularly conducted business activity.69 This may give the documents 
the indicia of reliability that the regularly conducted business activity exception 
relies on.70 However, without firmly meeting the requirements of the regularly 
conducted business activity exception, the recordings must bypass Confrontation 
Clause issues to be admissible.71 
The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause vests criminal defendants 
with the right to confront witnesses testifying against him or her.72 As the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Idaho v. Wright, “[t]o be admissible under the Confron-
tation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia 
of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness.”73 To meet this require-
ment, the recordings “must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception” to the point that “adversarial testing would add 
little to its reliability.”74 
Audio recordings from always-listening devices should not have to pass 
through these failsafe hearsay requirements to be admitted into evidence. Where 
written documents may present questions of reliability and trustworthiness, au-
dio recordings may overcome such issues uncomplicatedly.. For instance, a tran-
script could be written by or transcribed from anyone, with very little way to 
guarantee that the document did or did not come from any specific person. With 
audio recordings, however, voices can be compared and authenticated on a case 
by case basis. In fact, the Nevada Revised Statutes already provide that voices 
heard through electronic recordings may be sufficiently identified by opinion if 
there is sufficient connection between the recording and the alleged speaker.75 
Thus, Nevada should adopt a uniform hearsay exception for audio recordings 
created by always-listening devices to avoid unnecessary litigation over the ap-
plicability of less exact exceptions that often result in admission of the recording 
nevertheless. 
B. Transcripts and Recordings Under Nevada’s Authentication Laws 
One issue the legislature must consider is authentication of the recordings 
themselves. While an electronically recorded voice may be authenticated by 
opinion,76 parties may have extensive pre-trial arguments as to whether the 
 
69  Id. 
70  See Rosoff, 757 P.2d at 1326. 
71  Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818 (1990) (first citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 
(1986), then citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)). 
72  “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
73  Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. 
74  Id. at 821. 
75  NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.065 (2019). 
76  Id. 
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recording may be presented in court at all.77 While there are arguments to be 
made that the recording is self-authenticating or not, a solution to this inevitable 
dispute may already exist within the Federal Rules of Evidence.78 
Federal Rule of Evidence 902(13)—Certified Records Generated by an 
Electronic Process or System—states, “[a] record generated by an electronic pro-
cess or system that produces an accurate result” is self-authenticating so long as 
a qualified person can certify the process or system.79 This categorization of self-
authenticating evidence is exactly the type of solution the Nevada legislature 
should embrace ahead of any serious disputes about the authenticity of record-
ings from always-listening devices. By amending Nevada Revised Statute sec-
tion 52 and adding a section to the presumptions of authenticity covering elec-
tronic processes and systems, any conflict surrounding the authenticity of 
recordings can be handled without excessive litigation. 
C. Transcripts Irrelevant When Recordings Available 
With questions of authentication out of the way, there is a question to the 
relevance of the recordings. Any evidence that is brought into a Nevada court 
must be relevant.80 Nevada has defined relevant evidence to be “evidence having 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”81 Whether audio recordings are relevant is a case-by-case determina-
tion, but one question must be answered to rationalize legislation creating a spe-
cific rule for always-listening devices’ audio recordings: whether the use of au-
dio recordings is any more relevant than the use of transcripts that are likely to 
already be admissible under the current rules of evidence? 
The benefits of hearing these recordings are significant. Not only could the 
audio recordings dispel any questions about who activated the device, but they 
could also give key context of the tone, pace, and surrounding environment of 
the speaker when the question was asked. The trier of fact can use this infor-
mation to determine how much weight to give the evidence. When reading a 
transcript is the only option, all that context is lost. Words on a page have only 
the context that is awarded to them by the parties in court.82 While this Note does 
 
77  E.g., White v. Texas, 549 S.W.3d 146, 149–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (noting the admis-
sibility of an audio recording was the subject of pre-trial motions and argument). 
78  See FED. R. EVID. 902(13). 
79  Id. 
80  NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.025 (2019). 
81  Id. § 48.015. 
82  Norman N. Markel et al., The Relationship Between Words and Tone-of-Voice, 16 
LANGUAGE & SPEECH 15, 15 (1973). 
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not advocate for the removal of advocacy opportunities, the best evidence rule 
implies that the recordings should be utilized if possible.83 
The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced in 
court when the content of that document is at issue.84 Nevadan litigators face 
essentially identical versions of the best evidence rule in state and federal court.85 
Indeed, Nevada Revised Statute section 52.235 and Federal Rule of Evidence 
1002 both specifically require that the original writing, recording, or photograph 
is to prove the content of the writing, recording, or photograph.86 Similarly, both 
rules of evidence allow for the admission of copies if the original cannot “be 
obtained by any available judicial process.”87 
In the past, Nevada courts have referenced the best evidence rule, but only 
to hold that an exception applied.88 For example, in Young v. Nevada Title Co., 
the Nevada Supreme Court held that the best evidence rule did not bar copies of 
written work unless the writing is specifically offered into evidence to prove the 
terms of the writing.89 Additionally, in Tomlinson v. Nevada, the Nevada Su-
preme Court held that the best evidence rule does not bar transcripts of audio 
recordings to be admitted when the audio recording is no longer available.90 For 
examples of the best evidence rule mandating an original copy, one must look to 
opinions from the Ninth Circuit.91 
In United States v. Workinger, the Ninth Circuit court considered whether 
the best evidence rule had been violated when a transcript of an audio recording 
was admitted at trial.92 The court ultimately held that the transcript of an audio 
recording of defendant’s interview with his wife’s attorney was admissible be-
cause the audio recordings had been deleted in the ordinary course of business.93 
However, the court noted that “the tape . . . was the best evidence of its own 
 
83  Young v. Nevada Title Co., 744 P.2d 902, 904 (1987) (“[I]n proving the terms of a writing, 
where the terms are material, the original writing must be produced unless it is shown to be 
unavailable for some reason other than the serious fault of the proponent.” (alteration in orig-
inal) (emphasis omitted) (quoting EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 230 (2d 
ed. 1972))). 
84  Id. 
85  Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.235 (2019) (“To prove the content of a writing, recording 
or photograph, the original writing, recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise 
provided in this title.”), with FED. R. EVID. 1002 (“An original writing, recording, or photo-
graph is required in order to prove its content . . . .”). 
86  NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.235 (2019); FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
87  NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.255(2) (2019); FED. R. EVID. 1004(b). 
88  See, e.g., Young, 744 P.2d at 904; Tomlinson v. Nevada, 878 P.2d 311, 312–14 (1994). 
89  Young, 744 P.2d at 904. 
90  Tomlinson, 878 P.2d at 312–14 (holding a transcript of an audio recording to be admissible 
only because all audio copies had been destroyed). 
91  See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 363 F.3d 947, 953 (9th Cir. 2004) (excluding testimony 
evidence about the path of the defendant’s boat because the data from the boat’s GPS was 
available); United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1996); Lang v. Cullen, 
725 F. Supp. 2d 925, 971 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
92  Workinger, 90 F.3d at 1415. 
93  Id. 
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content.”94 Thus, if the recording was available, the best evidence rule would 
have compelled the court to admit the recording over a transcript.95 
A recent example of this policy in action can be found in the Central District 
of California.96 In Lang v. Cullen, Lang was arrested at the San Francisco Inter-
national Airport for, inter alia, possession of a firearm without a permit.97 Sev-
eral times over the next two weeks, Lang’s public defender and an investigator 
from the public defender’s office interviewed Lang while tape-recording their 
exchange.98 Prior to trial, the court granted Lang’s Motion in Limine to exclude 
the transcripts of those interviews which were being maintained in the files of 
the public defender’s office.99 The court held that because the audio recording 
was still available, the best evidence rule mandated that the parties bring the re-
cording into court, or leave out the content of the recording entirely.100 
This doctrine has a clear application to always-listening devices. Whenever 
a company details a transcript from an audio recording, there is a chance that 
something is misinterpreted or misunderstood.101 With something used as fre-
quently, and for as many reasons, as an always-listening device, there are simply 
too many chances that a request was misunderstood, transcribed improperly, and 
not reflected accurately by any written transcript. In the real world, a misstated 
transcript could be pieced together, and the true meaning can be assumed. In a 
court of law, there is too much on the line to leave an interpretation up to chance 
when a better alternative exists. Thus, the best evidence rule should apply to au-
dio recordings from always-listening devices, so the audio recordings are 
brought into evidence whenever possible. 
The issues of authentication and misapplication of searches made by devices 
accessed by multiple individuals are also addressed by applying the best evidence 
rule. A transcript made by the device could be based on the words of anyone.102 
An audio recording does not have these issues, as Nevada already allows for 
authentication of a voice by simply hearing it. Defendants and plaintiffs alike do 
not have to worry about false searches being used against them if audio record-
ings are the preference. In fact, this creates an additional incentive to keep audio 
recordings on the servers of whichever company hosts the always-listening de-
vice. If the recordings are being stored indefinitely, at no additional cost to the 
 
94  Id. 
95  See id.; United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 1976). 
96  Lang, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 972 n.83. 
97  Id. at 971. 
98  Id. at 972–74. 
99  Order Granting Petitioner’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Transcript of Audiotape at 3, 
Lang v. Woodford, No. CV-91-04061 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2010), rev’d sub nom. Lang v. Cul-
len, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925, 925 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
100  Id. 
101  Sophie Curtis, Worst Alexa Fails: Amazon Echo Users Share Voice Assistant’s Biggest 
Screw-Ups, MIRROR ONLINE (Jan. 2, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.mirror.co.uk/tech/worst-
alexa-fails-echo-amazon-11768630 [https://perma.cc/M2M9-A6F8]. 
102  See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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user, the user can prove that an incriminating use of the device was or was not 
uttered by them. 
One might assume that Nevada’s best evidence rule already covers audio 
recordings from always-listening devices. However, remember that Nevada Re-
vised Statute section 52.255(2) contains an exception which allows for tran-
scripts of recordings to be admitted when “[n]o original can be obtained by any 
available judicial process or procedure.”103 As discussed above, Arkansas was 
unable to establish that companies like Amazon must submit audio recordings 
when a court issues a subpoena for such a recording.104 If companies storing al-
ways-listening device audio recordings are not required to deliver audio record-
ings when Nevada courts request, prosecutors are hard pressed to introduce that 
evidence without the consent of the defendant.105 Without federal legislation 
compelling companies to comply with state subpoenas, the only audio recordings 
covered by the best evidence rule are recordings stored in the physical memory 
of the user’s always-listening device.106 
This unfortunate reality raises an important question: how many recordings 
are actually available to be brought into court? Even if a user manually enters 
their device settings to delete the recordings, the audio recordings remain on the 
device company’s servers.107 Yet, companies actively discourage their users from 
deleting these recordings.108 For example, Amazon claims that by not deleting 
the recordings, a user continuously improves their device’s ability to recognize 
speech and language.109 While it is all but certain that at least some users have 
deleted their recordings, it can be inferred that a vast majority of users have not 
or will not delete their recordings. 
Thus, by specifying that audio recordings still possessed on defendants’ de-
vices must be disclosed if they are relevant to the suit, this new legislation would 
address the issue of relevance and stand by Nevada’s best evidence rule.110 
III. PROTECTING NEVADANS’ CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
This Note cannot suggest that Nevada’s legislation codify a law requiring 
individuals to submit always-listening device data to law enforcement without 
first addressing the known constitutional issues such a law would bring. Part III 
 
103  NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.255(2) (2019). 
104  See supra Section I.B. 
105  See supra text accompanying notes 55–59. 
106  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.255 (2019). Recordings of this type would be original, obtaina-
ble, and easily authenticatable by opinion of the voice. 
107  Geoffrey A. Fowler, Alexa Has Been Eavesdropping on You This Whole Time, WASH. POST 
(May 6, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/06/alexa-has-
been-eavesdropping-you-this-whole-time [https://perma.cc/V76M-7BFJ]. 
108  Alexa, Echo Devices, and Your Privacy, supra note 25. 
109  Id. 
110  NEV. REV. STAT. § 52.235 (2019). 
21 NEV. L.J. 379 
394 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
 
of this Note specifically considers those constitutional issues and how they best 
guide Nevada’s legislation. 
A. Fourth Amendment Protections and Always-Listening Device Data 
 It has been argued that the government searching for and seizing recordings 
from always-listening devices is inherently in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.111 A common theme among those arguments is the overbreadth of the 
third-party doctrine, which will be discussed below.112 Some argue that the third-
party doctrine should not apply in cases where technology is involved because 
of the near necessity of utilizing third parties in the modern age of technology.113 
Others argue that the companies manufacturing the always-listening devices 
should develop the devices in such a way that they do not fall under the third-
party doctrine.114 Others argue that the third-party doctrine should be more nar-
rowly construed so always-listening devices are considered as personal property 
protected from physical trespasses by law enforcement.115 
This Note argues that Nevada should not wait for Supreme Court interpreta-
tions of the third-party doctrine to change or burden companies with manufac-
turing requirements. Instead, Nevada should adhere to the advice of Justices 
Alito and Thomas,116 and follow the path set by Utah117 by enacting its own leg-
islation allowing law enforcement to retrieve data from any always-listening de-
vice so long as they obtain a warrant first. 
 The third-party doctrine has been discussed as a major issue with police ac-
cess to private data.118 The doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Miller, excludes from Fourth Amendment protection data given up by 
 
111  See, e.g., Julia R. Shackleton, Alexa, Amazon Assistant or Government Informant?, 27 U. 
MIA. BUS. L. REV. 301, 322–23 (2019); Anne Pfeifle, Comment, Alexa, What Should We Do 
About Privacy? Protecting Privacy for Users of Voice-Activated Devices, 93 WASH. L. REV. 
421, 423 (2018); Katherine E. Tapp, Note, Smart Devices Won’t Be “Smart” Until Society 
Demands an Expectation of Privacy, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 83, 110 (2017). 
112  The third-party doctrine makes admissible any data entrusted by the defendant to third 
parties. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976). 
113  E.g., Pfeifle, supra note 111, at 429–30 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
114  E.g., Stacey Gray, Always on: Privacy Implications of Microphone-Enabled Devices, 
FUTURE PRIV. F. 3, 8–9 (2016), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/FPF_Always_On_ 
WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/58EB-NK53]. 
115  Shackleton, supra note 111, at 327. 
116  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261 (2018) (Alito & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) 
(“Legislation is much preferable to the development of an entirely new body of Fourth Amend-
ment caselaw for many reasons, including the enormous complexity of the subject, the need 
to respond to rapidly changing technology, and the Fourth Amendment’s limited scope.”). 
117  Molly Davis, Utah Just Became a Leader in Digital Privacy, WIRED (Mar. 22, 2019, 8:00 
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/utah-digital-privacy-legislation [https://perma.cc/AF7Q-
QKL3]. 
118  Pfeifle, supra note 111, at 429–30. 
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individuals to third parties.119 In Miller, the Court determined that Miller’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated when Miller’s bank gave his banking infor-
mation to ATF.120 The Court reasoned that because Miller had entrusted the in-
formation to a third party, his bank, he could not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy to the information.121 In a digital age where almost all information is 
stored on the server of one third party or another, even those within the Court 
have grown concerned that the third-party doctrine has become overly broad.122 
First, one proposed solution is to place the burden on the companies that 
create and service the always-listening devices.123 Rather than exposing users to 
privacy concerns under the third-party doctrine, companies could design the al-
ways-listening devices to store as much data as possible on the actual device in 
encrypted format.124 Hypothetically, this could minimize the data that police or 
federal agents could access when searching through the physical device without 
a warrant, and would limit the overall amount of data subject to seizure solely 
because it was transferred to third parties. 
While this approach addresses some of the issues of always-listening devices 
and privacy, it is unnecessary to provide Fourth Amendment protections to users. 
The argument is not without merit, but it ignores the impact this would have on 
users. These devices are not computers, cell phones, or servers. Always-listening 
devices were not purchased en masse until prices dropped to $25-$50 because, 
for most users, the devices serve the barebone purpose of a speaker and a search 
engine.125 
If companies are forced to overhaul the design of their products by including 
encryption, mass storage, and other requirements to avoid falling under the third-
party doctrine, the price of the devices would likely skyrocket. Nothing is stop-
ping companies from moving into the market for expensive, secured, always-
listening devices. Yet, consumers seem to want always-listening devices that are 
affordable.126 Pricing out the average customer from always-listening devices is 
not a simple solution to privacy concerns without consequence, it is a surefire 
way to shut down companies’ interest in developing the technology further. 
 
119  United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
120  Id. at 440. 
121  Id. at 442–43. 
122  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he prem-
ise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily dis-
closed to third parties . . . is ill suited to the digital age.” (citations omitted)). 
123  Gray, supra note 114, at 8 (explaining that manufacturers should build the product based 
in part upon consumer privacy expectations). 
124  See, e.g., Aaron Allsbrook, Five Easy Ways to Build Security into the Internet of Things, 
FORBES TECH. COUNCIL (Nov. 23, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechc 
ouncil/2016/11/23/five-easy-ways-to-build-security-into-the-internet-of-things [https://perma 
.cc/3QFP-576A]. 
125  Mark Sullivan, Apple HomePod Prices Drop as Cheap Smart Speakers Take off, FAST CO. 
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90280807 [https://perma.cc/Z927-26MM]. 
126  Id. 
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Those who choose to purchase always-listening devices simply must understand 
that convenience at such low prices comes with lessened protections for their 
confidentiality. 
Second, it has been argued that an unreasonable search occurs when police 
gain information from always-listening devices without a compelling interest.127 
This argument appears to analogize always-listening devices to personal prop-
erty like an individual’s car.128 However, it also recognizes that the third-party 
doctrine in its current form clearly applies to always-listening devices and even 
distinguishes the devices from other physical assets.129 Accordingly, the argu-
ment compels courts to reconsider the third-party doctrine and to “use a narrower 
construction that would greatly limit the government’s ability to obtain an indi-
vidual’s personal and private information.”130 
This argument appropriately recognizes that there are issues with police ac-
cess to always-listening devices under currently enacted laws. However, this 
Note disagrees with the perspective that the third-party doctrine grants “unfet-
tered discretion to law enforcement” in its current form.131 Yes, the government 
is currently able to gain access to data stored on always-listening devices, but it 
is only able to do so in two ways. 
The first way is accessing the always-listening device directly and pulling 
any relevant information from it.132 However, as previously discussed, data is not 
guaranteed to be stored on the device.133 Which leads to the second option, to 
gain the recordings from the company that stores them.134 Yet, companies have 
recognized that their users would rather not have their information spread to the 
government without a compelling interest.135 In fact, companies thus far have 
denied government requests to access this information, even in the face of a sub-
poena.136 If the current, broad, interpretation of the third-party doctrine does not 
require compliance with governmental requests for the recordings, narrowing the 
third-party doctrine so it does not apply to always-listening devices is unneces-
sary. 
Finally, it has been argued that principles from the Stored Communications 
Act137 should be applied to all digital data so long as the digital data is considered 
 
127  Shackleton, supra note 111, at 326. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. at 327. 
131  Id. 
132  Russell Brandom, How Much Can Police Find Out From a Murderer’s Echo?, THE VERGE 
(Jan. 6, 2017, 9:05 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/1/6/14189384 [https://perma.cc/5R 
VT-3KCN]. 
133  See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
134  See e.g., Brewster, supra note 58. 
135  See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
136  See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
137  Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701. 
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content information.138 The Stored Communications Act, passed in 1986, re-
quires disclosure of wire or electronic communications that exist in electronic 
storage upon proper government request.139 However, under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703(a), the government can only properly request such a disclosure from an 
individual with a valid warrant.140 Accordingly, this argument suggests that the 
lessened requirement for government requests for disclosure from the storage 
companies be increased from subpoena to warrant.141 
This argument provides excellent guidance for Nevada’s legislation. Nevada 
has already shown favor for the Stored Communications Act by reference in Ne-
vada Revised Statute section 179.467.142 All that remains is incorporating the 
warrant requirement and specifically addressing audio recordings from always-
listening devices. With these additions, the proposed law would provide law en-
forcement with access to always-listening devices, but would first require war-
rants to be issued on defendants for digital data they possess relevant to the spe-
cific crime. The law would both restrict evidence discovered from an always-
listening device to relevant recordings and prevent law enforcement from con-
ducting frivolous searches of devices without probable cause, quelling Fourth 
Amendment concerns. 
Fortunately, Nevada does not have to invent an entirely new set of laws to 
properly address these issues. In 2019, Utah enacted the Electronic Information 
or Data Privacy Act.143 This act adopts many of the principles of the Stored Com-
munications Act without mandating that third parties comply with warrantless 
requests for data.144 Specifically, it establishes that law enforcement may request 
digital data from users of technology or from the third parties that store the data 
so long as they have a valid warrant.145 The act also includes various exceptions 
to the warrant requirement that mirror well established exceptions such as exi-
gent circumstances or consent.146 Indeed, Utah’s Data Privacy Act serves as an 
excellent template for Nevada to allow requests for always-listening device data 
without violating the principles of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
138  Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1047 (2010). 
139  18 U.S.C. § 2703(b). 
140  Id. § 2703(a). 
141  Kerr, supra note 138, at 1043–44. 
142  NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.467 (2019) (“The Nevada Supreme Court . . . may issue orders re-
quiring a provider of electronic communication service to disclose . . . information pertaining 
to a subscriber to, or customer of, such service . . . upon the conditions prescribed by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2703.”). 
143  Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23c-101 (LexisNexis 
2020). 
144  Id. § 77-23c-102(1)(a). 
145  Id. 
146  Id. § 77-23c-102(2). 
21 NEV. L.J. 379 
398 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
 
B. First Amendment Issues yet Unanswered 
The use of always-listening device recordings in criminal cases bring up 
other issues that the courts have yet to address.147 One such issue is the First 
Amendment concern that a recording of expressive material is admitted as evi-
dence against a defendant without their consent.148 In the Bates case, Amazon 
rejected a subpoena demand for search results and audio recordings from an Echo 
device.149 Amazon contended that recordings taken by their devices contained 
expressive material, and the device’s responses themselves contained expressive 
material as well.150 Amazon also claimed that audio recordings should have First 
Amendment protections attached,151 and the government should have to show a 
compelling need for the data to bypass those protections.152 
Unfortunately, the Arkansas court never had a chance to decide the issue in 
Bates. The issue was bypassed because Bates consented to the use of the record-
ings.153 Thus, the issue of whether recordings of this type are considered expres-
sive materials which are inadmissible absent clear consent remains merely in the 
hypothetical. Yet, Nevada must take steps to enact legislation protecting Ne-
vadan’s Fourth Amendment rights regardless of the unknown issues yet to be 
fully analyzed in court.154 
IV. WHAT’S THE USE? REAL WORLD IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGES 
 With so many issues surrounding always-listening devices, it is understand-
able to question why Nevada should pioneer legislation which enters recordings 
and transcripts from always-listening devices into evidence by default. Part IV 
of this Note presents situations where such data from always-listening devices is 
incredibly useful to both law enforcement and users. 
A. Always-Listening Devices in Criminal Cases 
 Just this year, recordings from an always-listening device have been sought 
for use as evidence in a murder case.155 On July 12, 2019, Silvia Galva died from 
 
147  Heater, supra note 55. 
148  See id. 
149  Brewster, supra note 58. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Dwyer, supra note 40. 
154  To be sure, there may be First Amendment concerns arising from such legislation. How-
ever, those issues are beyond the scope of this Note which advocates for legislation preempting 
redundant litigation on issues courts have already analyzed in this and other jurisdictions. 
155  Linda Trischitta, Spear Impales Woman and Kills Her. Now Her Boyfriend Is Accused of 
Murder, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (July 16, 2019), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/ 
hallandale/fl-ne-hallandale-silvia-galva-homicide-20190716-57vpgdkiazhytaggu7gg5dfuna-s 
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a stab wound to her chest.156 Her boyfriend, Adam Crespo, claimed to police that 
the two were in an argument and he was trying to drag her out of bed.157 Accord-
ing to Crespo, he was facing away from her when she grabbed a spear with a 
twelve inch blade, which snapped and impaled Galva’s chest as Crespo contin-
ued to try to pull her out of bed.158 Crespo then claimed that he then pulled the 
blade out of her chest and put pressure on the wound while Galva’s friend called 
911 and performed CPR.159 While Crespo claimed that he did not believe the 
injury was severe, Galva died from her wounds, and Crespo was charged with 
murder.160 
This scenario is a perfect example of why always-listening devices should 
be admissible as evidence by default. On its face, this is an incredibly difficult 
situation for the justice system to deal with. While Crespo claimed that Galva’s 
death was an accident, there were no witnesses in the bedroom that could cor-
roborate or disprove his story.161 However, the police quickly started considering 
one piece of evidence: Crespo’s Amazon Echo device.162 Just one month after 
Galva’s death, Florida police were able to obtain a search warrant for all record-
ings taken by the two Echo devices in Crespo’s apartment on July 12, 2019.163 
 As previously discussed in this Note, Amazon has historically been unwill-
ing to give out recordings taken by their users’ devices.164 In the Bates case dis-
cussed above, Amazon refused to comply with an Arkansas search warrant, and 
only turned over the recordings when Bates consented to the police receiving 
them.165 However, in Crespo, police claim to have received the recordings from 
Amazon, with no official objections, after issuing their warrant.166 How these 
recordings will affect the case is yet to be seen.167 
 The recordings may prove to be unhelpful to either party in this case. Perhaps 
the event could have been missed altogether if the Echo was not activated during 
 
tory.html [https://perma.cc/AV6Z-VTED]; NBC News, Amazon’s Alexa May Have Witnessed 
Alleged Florida Murder, Authorities Say, WRCBTV (Nov. 2, 2019, 11:33 AM), https://www.w 
rcbtv.com/story/41263095/amazons-alexa-may-have-witnessed-alleged-florida-murder-auth 
orities-say [https://perma.cc/Y3VE-M28K]. 
156  Trischitta, supra note 155. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
161  Galva’s friend was in the house, but she was unable to tell police anything besides that 
there was an argument in the bedroom. Id. 
162  Rafael Olmeda, Alexa, Is He Guilty of Murder? Amazon Device May Have Heard Slaying, 
Cops Say, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/crime/fl 
-ne-amazon-alexa-murder-investigation-20191031-qccpvdl6kng5hcx3z6eusxa264-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/9M3S-LKHZ]. 
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164  See supra Section I.B. 
165  See supra Section I.B. 
166  Olmeda, supra note 162. 
167  Id. 
21 NEV. L.J. 379 
400 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:1  
 
the argument. Alternatively, the Echo could have been activated but still failed 
to record anything of use, or the Echo could have recorded damning evidence 
that helps one of the parties prove their case. No matter the outcome, it is im-
portant that the police and the defendant be able to access the recordings of the 
device so they can determine which of the situations they are facing. Further, 
police receiving the recordings without intense litigation or Crespo’s consent 
points to the gradual acceptance of always-listening device recordings being used 
in the criminal justice system. 
Despite Amazon’s spokespeople objecting to “overbroad or otherwise inap-
propriate demands” of customer information,168 it appears that Amazon’s stance 
on the issue has shifted somewhat over the past few years.169 Amazon’s compli-
ance with a warrant, absent public consent from their client, marks a new age for 
always-listening devices in the justice system. While some argue that this new 
age of always-listening devices is an invasion of privacy that ruins the sanctity 
of the home,170 this Note argues that these devices have the potential to provide 
safety to a group of people that are constantly in danger. 
B. Always-Listening Devices as Deterrents to Domestic Violence 
Domestic violence is an issue that affects more than ten million victims a 
year in the United States.171 In a 2009 special report, the U.S. Department of 
Justice published their findings on domestic violence in America.172 According 
to the 2005 National Crime Victimization Survey, the annual domestic violence 
rate—the amount of people who self-reported being victims of intimate partner 
domestic violence—was 0.59 percent of women and 0.21 percent of men.173 
 
168  “Amazon spokeswoman Faith Eischen told The Washington Post that . . . [Amazon] ‘ob-
jects to overbroad or otherwise inappropriate demands as a matter of course.’ ” Kayla Epstein, 
Police Think Amazon’s Alexa May Have Information on a Fatal Stabbing Case, WASH. POST 
(Nov 2, 2019, 5:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/02/police-
think-amazons-alexa-may-have-information-fatal-stabbing-case [https://perma.cc/NQ3L-4N 
ES]. 
169  “Amazon does not disclose customer information in response to government demands un-
less we’re required to do so to comply with a legally valid and binding order.” Law Enforce-
ment Information Requests, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.ht 
ml?nodeId=GYSDRGWQ2C2CRYEF [https://perma.cc/CGY2-PVVJ]. 
170  See supra Section III.A. 
171  MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJ. PREVENTION & CONTROL, CDC, NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 38 tbls. 4.1 & 
4.2 (2011), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/D6TY-VA9P]; NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
(2020), https://assets.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence-2020080709350855.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/68L9-AHP8]. 
172  NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES vi 
(2009). 
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Always-listening devices have already been used to help protect domestic 
violence victims.174 In July 2017, a woman activated her nearby Amazon Echo 
device during a violent exchange with her boyfriend, Eduardo Barros, in their 
New Mexico home.175 The device called 911, and dispatchers heard the woman 
yelling “Alexa, call 911.”176 Police arrived at the scene and eventually arrested 
Barros after an hours-long standoff.177 Referring to always-listening devices, 
Sheriff Manuel Gonzales III later told reporters, “[t]his amazing technology def-
initely helped save a mother and her child from a very violent situation.”178 
While the New Mexican woman’s active use of always-listening devices 
protected her from an actively violent situation, the deterrent value of warrant 
access to the audio recordings is far more widespread. It is sometimes wrongly 
assumed that if victims know that they can dissuade their abusers from acting 
violently by calling the police, they will.179 Even with police intervention avail-
able with a 911 call, studies show that many victims choose not to actively invoke 
police protection.180 For victims that do not necessarily want their abusers to be 
arrested or prosecuted, always-listening devices could provide an alternative 
means of protection. 
If a person fears for their safety in their own home, they would be able to 
take control of a hostile situation by saying “Alexa/Google/Siri, record this con-
versation.” By recording the encounter, the victim would force the abuser to 
deescalate because the audio of the interaction would be stored offsite. This pro-
cess would provide victims an alternative means to dissuade their abusers in in-
dividual situations while collecting evidence of instances of abuse if they later 
decide to involve the police. 
Unfortunately, this deterrent value is stifled because prosecutors are not 
guaranteed access to such recordings without the consent of the victim.181 Do-
mestic violence studies suggest that prosecutors are less likely to charge for is-
sues like attempted murder that required subjective findings like criminal in-
tent.182 This was likely due to prosecutors generally facing hesitant involvement 
 
174  Marcus Harun, ‘Alexa’ Automatically Calls 911 After Amazon Echo Overhears Domestic 
Violence Attack, FOX61 (July 11, 2017, 9:31 AM), https://fox61.com/2017/07/11/alexa-auto-
matically-calls-911-after-amazon-echo-overhears-domestic-violence-attack [https://perma.cc 
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from victims who have close relationships with their abusers.183 Studies indicate 
that it is not uncommon for victims to request the offender not be arrested184 and 
almost half of victims do not wish for their abuser to be prosecuted.185 
Because victims may be understandably hesitant to assist prosecutors, and 
because there is no law which currently guarantees that recordings from always-
listening devices may be seized and entered into evidence, the deterrent value of 
always-listening devices is incredibly limited. Without key witnesses to assist, 
law enforcement is currently shoehorned into charging for lesser offenses or dis-
missing the case entirely.186 To this point, one study revealed that in 1995, when 
the Milwaukee prosecutor changed local policy to no longer require victims to 
participate in charging conferences, prosecutors began accepting three times as 
many domestic violence cases.187 The reasons that victims do not want to assist 
with arrests or prosecutions is an invariably complicated issue, but one that could 
be potentially bypassed in many situations by the presence of an always-listening 
device. 
Depending on the quality of recordings from always-listening devices, pros-
ecutors could find that a victim’s testimony is unnecessary to prove instances of 
violence and subjective criminal elements like criminal intent. It is in these situ-
ations that an always-listening device specific rule of evidence would be imper-
ative. Without the appropriate witness to lay the foundation for the recordings, 
prosecutors could possess a smoking gun and have no way to bring it in to trial. 
If Nevada were to implement this Note’s suggested changes to Nevada Revised 
Statute section 52,188 the recordings could be brought in through the testimony 
of an Amazon/Google/Apple employee who specializes in the storage and re-
trieval of always-listening device recordings.189 
Accordingly, if abusers know that their actions in the home can be recorded 
and accessed, even against their victim’s wishes, they would no longer be able 
to rely on intimidating or persuading their victims to not call the police or partic-
ipate in prosecution. The third-party involvement of always-listening devices 
would serve as a significant deterrent to abusers acting violently towards others 
in the home without marking the victims as the cause of the deterrent. 
Of course, any deterrent value would rely on both a future where always-
listening devices are so intertwined to home life that absence of these devices 
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would be of note, and on a society that accepts and encourages the use of always-
listening device recordings in this way. If Nevada adopts this Note’s suggestions 
in anticipation of this future, always-listening devices could become a tool which 
empowers domestic violence victims to retake control of their environment and 
prevent future abuse. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEVADA 
A. Minor Changes to Existing Nevada Laws 
 The issues above leave a difficult situation for legislators to work through as 
they tackle always-listening devices. For legislation to allow audio recordings 
taken by always-listening devices into evidence at trial, the legislation must ad-
dress each of the many issues discussed above. 
First, new laws must provide a standardized hearsay exception so the gov-
ernment is not forced to wedge the recordings in under another, less appropriate, 
exception. Second, new laws must specify a process to ensure that audio from an 
always-listening device is authenticated so the trier of fact need only determine 
if the recording is of the defendant’s words.190 Third, new laws must establish 
that the best evidence rule applies to transcripts of the audio recordings and thus 
deny entrance of transcripts whenever audio recordings are available.191 Finally, 
new laws must allow law enforcement access to devices whenever the recordings 
are relevant, but still establish strong warrant requirements to avoid unconstitu-
tional invasions of privacy.192 
As to the hearsay issue, Nevada should enact a new exception to hearsay for 
“smart assistant communications.” The exception should allow audio recordings 
created by smart assistants through always-listening devices to bypass hearsay 
objections. This will negate unnecessary objections to recordings that, if authen-
ticated and determined to be spoken by the defendant, do not constitute tradi-
tional hearsay. 
As to the authentication issue, Nevada should amend Nevada Revised Stat-
ute section 52 to include provisions from Federal Rule of Evidence 902(13). Ne-
vada should specify that records generated by electronic processes or systems 
that produce accurate results are authenticated so long as a qualified person can 
certify the process or system.193 This will ensure that the trier of fact is able to 
consider whether the defendant actually engaged with the device by matching 
the voice recorded instead of text transcribed. 
As to the relevance issue, Nevada should double-down on its version of the 
best evidence rule by allowing law enforcement to request audio recordings when 
it is relevant to a case. Nevada should enact legislation that gives law 
 
190  Supra Section II.B. 
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enforcement a clear process to request such recordings from a defendant’s own 
device and from companies who are willing to adhere to the request. 
To that point, and as to the Fourth Amendment concerns, Nevada should 
enact legislation similar to Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act.194 
Nevada should enact legislation that allows law enforcement to request data from 
always-listening devices from users or the third-parties that store the data. How-
ever, the legislation must require warrants to ensure that only relevant, particular, 
and necessary data is accessed. 
CONCLUSION 
With relatively minor changes to already existing Nevada Law, Nevada can 
avoid facing the same evidentiary, constitutional, and ethical questions Arkansas 
faced in Bates or Florida faced in Crispo. Instead, Nevada can move forward 
with confidence that the new age of always-listening devices will not hinder the 
administration of justice or diminish Nevadans’ constitutional rights. 
 
194  Electronic Information or Data Privacy Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23c-101–105 (Lex-
isNexis 2020). 
